14 August Independence Day Pakistan

Indeed, a host of factors has gone into the making of Pakistan. Of prime significance among them were: a fortuitous configuration of forces and events (both natinal and international), the myopic policies of the Indian National Congress, the adroit leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, and the massive response his appeal for Pakistan elicited from the Muslim masses across the length and breadth of Indian subcontinent.

However, as I have argued in Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah (1981), by far the most critical variable was Jinnah himself. Of course, the "response" factor was also crucial for the simple reason that without that measure of response, there would have been no Pakistan; but, then, the response itself was the handiwork of Jinnah, since he alone, and no one else, could have elicited that response.
And that response did not come easily, much less simultaneously or uniform from various regions in the subcontinent. Moreover, Jinnah had to labour long and hard; he had to build up unity in Muslims' disparate ranks, step by step; he had to work assiduously for nine long years before he could prepare Muslim India politically, psychologically, and otherwise to a point that it returned an overwhelming verdict in favour of Pakistan during the general elections of 1945-46.
The present article concerns the respective roles of the Muslim majority and minority provinces in building up the final response, the differential in their respective responses at various stages, and their criticality in the final denouement.

The instrument through which the Muslim response to Pakistan was articulated and built up was the All India Muslim League (AIML). The AIML, founded in 1906, gathered strength and momentum within a decade, went into eclipse during the tumultuous, emotion-laden Khalifat movement (1920-23), was revived by Jinnah with the assistance of Fazl-i-Hussain in 1924, became divided into Jinnah and Shafi Leagues over the Muslim response to Simon Commission in 1927, and later into Aziz and Hedayat factions (1933), and was finally re-united under Jinnah's leadership in 1934. The united Muslim League held its first session in Bombay in April 1936, where it formulated its programme and decided for the first time in its annals to contest (provincial) elections, scheduled for early 1937. Despite the lack of an organizational network, of finances, and of an organ to back up its cause and candidates, the Muslim League yet secured 112 (about 23 percent) out of 491 Muslim seats. Its performance was comparatively better in the Muslim minority provinces, but poor in the Muslim majority ones, except in Bengal where it emerged as the single largest party. However, having won the largest number of Muslim seats on an all-India basis, it emerged as the only Muslim party on an all-India plane. Moreover, it could lay claim to the pan-Indian Muslim constituency.

Although three more years were to elapse before the Pakistan platform was adopted at Lahore, the struggle for Pakistan had, in a sense, begun in 1937. these three crucial years represented the predatory stage for launching the Pakistan demand, and had Jinnah not taken the steps transforming it into the authoritative spokesman of the pan-Indian Muslim community, the Pakistan platform could never have been adopted, and if perchance it had, the movement would have failed to take-off. Hence, in the final analysis, the fortunes of the Muslim League at various stags and in various regions provided, as it were, an index to the nature, quantum and strength of Muslim response to the Pakistan demand, whether actual or potential, at various junctures and in various regions.

One reliable index of the strength of the AIML in the Muslim majority and minority regions is provided by the number of League sessions held in the two regions. Till 1937 when the Muslim League was reorganized, 19 sessions (or part sessions) were held in the Muslim minority areas, and 11 in the majority ones, four of them in Calcutta, and the inaugural session in Dacca (1960); (for our purposes, the whole of Bengal and Punjab are considered Muslim majority areas, and not the post 1947 bifurcated provinces). This measure of AIML's strength in the minority areas was also reflected in its showing at the hustings in early 1937.

As Anil Seal has shown, political consciousness had first come to the coastal presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, and much later and much too slowly to the land-locked provinces of Upper India. This was also the case with Muslims, except for United Provinces which had been the focal point of Muslim politics since the days of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. For long, Bengali Muslims had, for various reasons, been denied an equitable share in the portals of power, and felt oppressed; that, in part, explains why the Muslim League, often considered the party of the underdog in power terms on an all-India plane, had always shown strength in Bengal much the same way as it did in Muslim minority areas, and as against the predominantly Muslim north-west India.

A strategist that Jinnah was, he was keen to consolidate his gains in the minority provinces and in Bengal before launching the Muslim League further afield. The developing policy of the Congress in these provinces and its posture in Bengal gave him the chance of a life-time which he seized adroitly. The Muslim League entered into a coalition in Bengal with Fazlul Haq's KPP, and in the Hindu provinces, into a headlong confrontation with the Congress. The Muslim north-west (Punjab, Sind and the Frontier), then dominated by provincial notables and parties, could well wait till he had consolidated the Muslim League and made it a comprehensive all India Muslim party vis-a-vis the Congress.

As attested to by both Professors Coupland and Robinson, the U.P. was the "key" province of Indian politics; it was also the province which had provided Muslim leadership on an all-India plane. U.P. also became the test case for the Congress' attitude on the Muslim issue. It was therefore, to be won over for the Muslim League at all costs. This explains why Jinnah for Lucknow as the venue for the 1937 session instead of Lahore where the reception to the League was unpredictable in view of the Unionist ministry under Sir Sikander Hayat Khan.

In the post-1936 period as well, the pattern of League sessions, in terms of their venues, was the same as in the pre-1936 period: five in Muslim minority provinces as against two (Lahore and Karachi) in the majority provinces; (no sessions were held during 1944-47). However, the most important of them were Lucknow (1937) and Lahore (1940). "We are here not to follow history but to create history", declared the Raja of Mahmudabad, Chairman, Reception Committee, at Lucknow. Jinnah himself considered the Lucknow session as "the most critical" in the League's entire history (as of that date), involving "the fate and future of the Musalmans of India, and the country at large". It would however, be superseded by Lahore which Jinnah termed as "a landmark in the history of India". Even so, but for Lucknow, there would have been no Lahore.

In perspective, Lucknow represented more than a turning point in modern Muslim India's history. Here the AIML transformed itself into a democratic organization, declared its entry into mass politics, and added to itself external appurtenances (such as a party flag, an anthem, and a Volunteer corps) which symbolize and entrench the party in the popular mind.

Lucknow also witnessed the adherence of three important regional notables to the Muslim Leageu's ranks. Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Fazlul Haq and Sir Muhammad Sadullah, the prime Ministers of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam respectively, joined the AIML along with their followers in the provincial legislatures. Their adherence ensured for the AIML a dominant position in the Muslim majority provinces as well, repaired a flaw in its representative status, and transformed it into a pan-Indian party in the real sense of the term.

Lucknow also represented the first break-through to revitalize and reorganize the Muslims. It electrified and enthused the Muslim masses as nothing else had done before. And it produced immediate results. Within three months, some 90 branches were set up and about 100,000 new members were enrolled in the United Provinces along. Within two months some 40 branches were set up in the Punjab, and Begum Shah Nawaz requested affiliation of Punjab Provincial Muslim Women's League with the AIML. The enrollment campaign in Sindh had picked up by February 1938, and a visit by Jinnah was suggested by Sir Abdullah Haroon. Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy assured Jinnah of setting up branches all over Bengal, and Abdul Matin Chowdury reported of the Assam Provincial League gaining in strength. And between 1 January 1938 and 12 September 1942, the Muslim League won 46 (82%) out of 56 Muslim seats in by-elections.

Thus the period between Lucknow (1937) and Lahore (1940) was much too crucial in endowing the Muslims and the Muslim League the "third party" status in Indian's body politic, the other two being the British, and Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress. The struggle during this period was waged chiefly in the Muslim minority provinces except for Bengal, and the Muslims in these provinces served as the vanguard for the battle of Muslim India. The all-India (as against provincial) leadership was also for the most part provided by these provinces. Leaving out Jinnah, who had shifted himself from a Muslim Wind to the Muslim diaspora, the two most important offices, viz., those of the General Secretary and the Treasurer, were occupied respectively by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and the Raja of Mahmudabad. Again, the attitude of the Congress during 1937-39 was in issue concerning Muslims mostly in these provinces, and the exit of its ministries provided the Muslim League the chance to demonstrate its strength, which it did by observing a "Deliverance Day" on 22 December 1939. And by then the Muslim League had been recognized, though reluctantly, as representing a sizeable body of Muslims, by both the British and the Congress.

But for these developments, which were for the most part confined to the Muslim minority provinces, the Muslim League could not and would not have launched upon the big leap forward: to fashion a permanent platform in Pakistan in 1940. Meantime, thanks to Abdullah Haroon, the Sindh Provincial Conference in October 1938 proved to be a trend setter: for it proclaimed Hindus and Muslims as two distinct nations, and called for "political self-determination" and "full independence" for Muslims.

Interestingly through, the Pakistan goal, despite its being solely concerned with the Muslim majority provinces, did not initially enthuse these provinces as it did the Muslim minority provinces. This may, in part, be explained by the ambivalence of Sikander (Punjab) and Fazlul Haq (Bengal), and the active opposition of the Frontier (Congress Leaders. But if the movement for Pakistan were to succeed, the main centers of Muslim population - viz., Bengal and the Punjab-had to be won over. Indeed, as pointed out by C.H. Philips, The Muslim areas were the key to Pakistan". And Jinnah knew this more than any one else. Hence the Muslim League would now concentrate almost wholly on these areas. The marathon campaign against the Congress' refusal to concede Muslims their religio-political entity in India's body politic during 1937-39 was extremely successful, culminating in the recognition of Muslims as the "third" side in the Indian political triangle. Now the impending battle was against "The traditional provincial politician, with his regional loyalties" in the Muslim majority areas.

In the post-Lahore period, the Muslim League was activitiated in these areas as never before. Such was the mass response that Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, reported in January 1941 that "it would be most difficult politically for either Sikander or Fazlul Haq, even if they wanted to do so themselves, to come out against him" (Jinnah) and, by implication, against the Muslim League. And in March 1942 he reported that in Bengal and the Punjab, support for the League was "probably stronger" outside the Assembly than within, and that the Bengal League's demand for a general election after Haq's revolt (1941) was "significant".

This surmise was amply corroborated by primary League and membership figures. Primary Leagues in 11 out of 18 districts in Bengal totaled 1565 in 1944; membership in ten districts stood at 541,170. Sindh claimed some 300,000 members-i.e., about one-fourth of the adult Muslim population -in 1944. Additionally, at the instance of G.M. Syed, the Sindh Assembly passed a resolution in favour of Pakistan.

Despite Khizr Hayat Tiwana's revolt in 1943, Punjab reported a 200,000 membership figure in 1944-45, and the Muslim Students Federation's campaign in rural Punjab under Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi had unnerved the Punjab premier. The Sirajganj Conference (1941) in Bengal and the Sialkot Conference (1943) in the Punjab Indicated how deep a dent had been caused in the strongholds of the traditional politicians, with their regional loyalties.

All these developments would still not have ensured the emergence of Pakistan, but for the massive verdict returned in the general elections of 1945-46. The Congress fought and nail. How crucial was that verdict comes out, inter alias in the voluminous correspondence carried on by the indefatigable Sardar Vallabhbhai Pate (who, though ailing, ran the Congress election campaign so determinedly and so efficiently) with the Congress leaders in the provinces, to keep himself apprised of what was happening in the Muslim constituencies. He was keen on getting all the disparate groups opposed to the Muslim League forge a united front and issued detailed instructions to the provincial leaders about the strategy to be adopted. Though equally keen on getting a negative verdict from each and every Muslim seat throughout India, yet he conceded " the Punjab and Bengal hold the key in the present election... " He told Bhim Sen Sachar, " The Punjab is a key and prosperous province of Pakistan"; indeed, " The Punjab holds the key to the future of India". And he assured Azad about the availability of ample funds to contest Muslim seats in Bengal, Assam, and the Frontier, and wrote to Vazirani and Shidwa about " defeating the League" in Sindh.

In the elections to the Central Assembly, the Muslim League secured all the 30 Muslim seats, with 87.7 per cent vote being in its favour. In the provincial polls, the Muslim League won 113 out of 119 seats (94.95%) in Bengal, 79 out of 86 seats (91.9%) in the Punjab; 28 out of 36 seats (77.8%) in Sindh; and 17 out of 36 seats (47.2%) in the Frontier (but polled more votes than the Congress: 41.65% against 38.34%). More astounding was the vote in Pakistan's favor in the minority provinces; 31 out of 34 seats (91%) in Assam, 34 out of 40 seats (85%) in Bihar, 54 out of 66 seats (82%) in the U.P.; 13 out of 14 seats (93%) in the Central Provinces (C.P), and all the seats (100%) in Orissa, Bombay and Madras.

A breakdown and analysis of the election results, region wise, indicate the following. On the all-India basis, the Muslim League won 87.7 percent of the central and provincial Muslim seats and about 85 per cent of the votes cast in the (contested) Muslim constituencies. In the Muslim majority provinces (Bengal, Punjab, Sindh and the Frontier), its aggregate percentage of seats was 84.5 per cent. More important, the " key provinces' of Bengal and the Punjab had voted overwhelmingly in Pakistan's favour. The league's score in Sindh was flawed due to the post-nomination rebellion of G.M. Syed, but a mid-term election in December 1946 returned a massive Verdict in Pakistan's favor, rectifying the previously flawed situation. The Frontier vote was somewhat disappointing (although not too inextricable because of a host of reasons); but the call for Pakistan really picked up during 1946-47 to a point that in the Frontier Referendum of July 1947, the vote in Pakistan's favor was 99 percent of the votes cast and about 51 per cent of the total electorate.

In the Muslim minority provinces, the aggregate percentage of seats won for Pakistan was 89.9 per cent. The contribution of these provinces is also noteworthy on three counts. First, the major contributions to the League's election fund came from Bombay presidency, the Gujrati Muslim business houses in Transvaal (South Africa) and the Muslim businessmen and merchants of Calcutta while even the Punjab being short of funds to the tune of Rs. 300,000. These donations enabled the Muslim League not only to offset somewhat the Congress' edge in terms of funds (e.g., the Congress allocated Rs. 150,000 for Muslim seats in Bengal and provided for more funds from G.D. Birla, Congress' chief financier), but also to fight the elections successfully in the Muslim majority provinces. Second was the singular contribution of the Ali students during the election campaign in the Punjab, Sindh and the Frontier (as delineated and documented by Mukhtar Zaman in his Students' Role in the Pakistan Movement).

Third, and most important, was the altruism of Muslims in the minority provinces. In voting for Pakistan, the Muslims in the majority areas were voting for power to themselves, but those in the minority areas were voting for power the their brethren in the majority areas. They were, moreover, voting for scuttling the maneuverability and the immense advantage that the inclusion of these areas in an all-India federation or confederation would have provided them, and to offer themselves as scapegoats" for the emergence of Pakistan. And for their Verdict in Pakistan's favor, they had to pay in blood, tears and toil. About one-half million Muslims in the minority areas perished in the conflagration that engulfed the subcontinent during 1946-47 And even to this day fifty eight years after event, they are paying, and that without any painful reappraisals, without any regrets and without any remorse, for their " crime" in helping their co-religionists across the border to have a sovereign state of their own, independent of the rest of residue India. To conclude, then. The contribution of the minority provinces in the making of Pakistan was as follows. They strengthened and consolidated the Muslim League as a pan-Indian Muslim party to a point that it could fashion a permanent platform in Pakistan and call for the division of India in 1940. They provided the initial momentum for Pakistan while those in the majority areas, especially those in the power structures of the Punjab and the Frontier, were lukewarm. They contributed substantially and significantly in terms of experienced and dedicated leadership, funds, and publication of literature, election workers and publicists in the final battle for Pakistan.

Even so, all this would have been of no avail, had the Pakistan movement not really picked up in the majority areas, and had they not responded so massively to the call for Pakistan in the closing years of the struggle. Had they not voted for Pakistan, there would certainly have been no Pakistan? Likewise, had the minority provinces not built up so assiduously the momentum for Pakistan in the initial years or had they voted en bloc against Pakistan, there would probably have been no Pakistan.

Thus, in the final analysis, the majority and minority provinces played complementary roles in the birth of Pakistan, and their respective roles were equally critical. Pakistan was demanded in the name of the Muslim nation in undivided India. By the same token, and as the foregoing analysis indicates, the creation of Pakistan must be laid to the door of each and every Muslim in undivided India.